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Freedom of the Will
by Jonathan Edwards
PART I.
WHEREIN ARE EXPAINED AND STATED VARIOUS TERMS AND THINGS
BELONGING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE ENSUING DISCOURSE
Concerning the Nature of the Will
Concerning the determination of
the Will
Concerning the meaning of the
terms, Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence
Of the distinction of natural and
moral Necessity, and Inability
Concerning the notion of Liberty,
and of moral Agency
PART II
WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS
OR CAN BE ANY SORT OF FREEDOM OF WILL, AS THAT WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OF THE
LIBERTY OF ALL MORAL AGENTS; AND WHETHER ANY SUCH THING EVER WAS OR CAN BE CONCEIVED OF
Showing the
manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's
self-determining Power
Several supposed
ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered
Whether any event
whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its existence
Whether Volition
can arise without a Cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul
Showing, that if
the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether
impertinent, and cannot help the cause ofArminian Liberty; and how, this being the state
of the case, Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently
Concerning the
Will determining in things which are perfectly indifferent in the view of the mind
Concerning the
Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference
Concerning the
supposed Liberty of the will, as opposite to all Necessity
Of the Connexion
of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding
Volition
necessarily connected with the influence of Motives: with particular observations on the
great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings about the Freedomof the Will
The evidence of
Gods certain Foreknowledge of the volitions of moral Agents
God's certain
foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a
contingence of those volitions as is without all necessity
Whether we
suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any thing antecedent, or not,
yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian liberty
PART III
WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS
OR CAN BE ANY SORT OF FREEDOM OF WILL, AS THAT WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OF THE
LIBERTY OF ALL MORAL AGENTS; AND WHETHER ANY SUCH THING EVER WAS OR CAN BE CONCEIVED OF
God's moral
Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy
The Acts of the
Will of the human soul of Jesus Christ, necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous,
praise-worthy, rewardable, &c
The case of such
as are given up of God to sin, and of fallen man in general, proves moral Necessity and
Inability to be consistent with Blameworthiness
Command and
Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral Inability to obey
That Sincerity of
Desires and Endeavours, which is supposed to excuse in the non-performance of things in
themselves good, particularly considered
Liberty of
indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all,
either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions of
Liberty and moral Agency
Arminian notions
of moral Agency inconsistent with all Influence of Motive and Inducement, in either
virtuous or vicious actions
PART IV
WHEREIN THE CHIEF GROUNDS OF THE
REASONINGS OF ARMINIANS, IN SUPPORT AND DEFENCE OF THE FOREMENTIONED NOTIONS OF LIBERTY,
MORAL AGENCY, &c. AND AGAINST THE OPPOSITE DOCTRINE, ARE CONSIDERED
The essence of
the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will, lies not in their
cause, but their nature
The Falseness and
Inconsistence of that Metaphysical Notion of Action and Agency Which Seems to be Generally
Entertained by the Defenders of the Arminian Doctrine concerning Liberty, Moral Agency,
&c
The Reasons Why
Some Think It Contrary To Common Sense, To Suppose Those Things Which Are Necessary, To Be
Worthy of Either Praise Or Blame
It Is Agreeable
To Common sense, And The Natural Notions of Mankind, To Suppose Moral Necessity To Be
Consistent With Praise And Blame, Reward And Punishment
Concerning Those
Objections, That This Scheme Of Necessity Renders All Means and Endeavours For The
Avoiding Of Sin, Or The Obtaining Virtue And Holiness, Vain And To No Purpose; And That It
makes Men No More Than Mere Machines In Affairs Of Morality And Religion
Concerning That
Objection Against The Doctrine Which Has Been Maintained, That It Agrees With The Stoical
Doctrine O Faith, And The Opinions of Mr. Hobbes
Concerning The
Necessity Of The Divine Will
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